Right to Protest in India: Police Permission and Law

Quick answer: what is the legal position on protest in India?

The right to protest flows from Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), and may be restricted only on the grounds in Articles 19(2) and 19(3). Police may regulate assemblies under the Police Act, 1861 and prohibit them under Section 163 of the BNSS, 2023, but regulation cannot become a blanket ban.

Syllabus mapping

• Prelims: Articles 19(1)(a)-(g) and 19(2)-(6), Section 163 BNSS, Sections 148-151 BNSS, Section 223 BNS, Sections 30 and 30A of the Police Act 1861, State List Entries 1 and 2, landmark judgments.
• Mains GS-2: Fundamental Rights and reasonable restrictions; the police in a democracy; police reform.
• Essay / Ethics: dissent and democracy; proportionality in state force; accountability of uniformed services.

Why in news

On 20 July 2026, the opening day of Parliament's Monsoon Session, protesters attempted to march from Jantar Mantar to Parliament in New Delhi. The march, styled "Chalo Sansad" and called by the Cockroach Janta Party, demanded reform of the National Testing Agency and the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan over the NEET-UG paper leak.

On crowd size, be careful. Estimates vary widely and none is official — reports range from several thousand at the march site to figures of 50,000–100,000 for the wider mobilisation. Do not cite a precise number in an answer; write "tens of thousands, by varying estimates" instead. Delhi Police stated that more than 118 police personnel were injured and around 70 protesters detained. Injury figures for protesters are disputed: The Hindu refers to 80 injured, while a petition before the Supreme Court alleged at least 60. Delhi Police denied that pellet guns were used, calling the claim "false and misleading".

Ahead of it, Delhi Police imposed prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 across the New Delhi district. Deputy Commissioner of Police Sachin Sharma said no permission had been sought or granted. Protesters were stopped at barricades short of Parliament Street, tear gas was used, and eyewitness accounts reported by The Indian Express described lathis being used to push back the crowd. Delhi Police said "no such incident has taken place and protest is being handled professionally". Metro stations were closed and demonstrators reported losing mobile connectivity.

A disputed number. Sources conflict on injuries: The Hindu refers to "the 80 protesters injured", a Supreme Court writ petition alleges "at least 60". Neither is officially confirmed, and Delhi Police has denied that pellet guns were used, calling such claims "false and misleading".

What followed matters more for the syllabus than the incident. A batch of writ petitions reached the Supreme Court, and on 27 July 2026 a bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana observed orally that the right to peaceful protest is constitutionally guaranteed, that "merely because there is agitation cannot justify police excess", and that "uniformity of protocol" was needed nationally. Connected petitions were listed for 28 July 2026. Pradhan resigned on 25 July 2026.

Background and core concept: a right without its own Article

Search the Constitution for the words "right to protest" and you will not find them. The right is a construction, assembled from two clauses drafted for different purposes and restricted on different grounds. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression: a placard, a slogan, a hunger strike is each expression. Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right "to assemble peaceably and without arms". Together they protect gathering in public to voice a grievance. Two further clauses get pulled in — 19(1)(c), association, which protects the organisation behind a protest, and 19(1)(d), free movement, which is why march routes and barricading raise constitutional and not merely administrative questions.

The restriction clauses are not identical, and that is the exam point

Most candidates memorise Article 19(2) and assume the same grounds apply to assembly. They do not.

Freedom	Restriction clause	Permissible grounds
19(1)(a) Speech and expression	Article 19(2)	Sovereignty and integrity of India; security of the State; friendly relations with foreign States; public order; decency or morality; contempt of court; defamation; incitement to an offence — eight grounds
19(1)(b) Assembly	Article 19(3)	Sovereignty and integrity of India; public order — two grounds
19(1)(c) Association	Article 19(4)	Sovereignty and integrity of India; public order; morality — three grounds
19(1)(d) Movement	Article 19(5)	Interests of the general public; protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe

The grounds for restricting assembly are the narrowest of the four. A ban on a march cannot be defended on decency, defamation or foreign-relations grounds; the state must show a threat to public order or to the sovereignty and integrity of India, and "public order" in Supreme Court doctrine means something graver than inconvenience. Two features complete the picture. Article 19 freedoms belong to citizens alone. And public order and police are State List Entries 1 and 2, which is why regulation differs between Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata, and why the Court's July 2026 remark about "uniformity of protocol" cuts against the federal grain.

Key facts and figures

Particular	Detail
Constitutional basis of protest	Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), supported by 19(1)(c) and 19(1)(d)
Restriction on assembly	Article 19(3) — sovereignty and integrity of India; public order
Prohibitory order provision	Section 163, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Predecessor provision	Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Who may issue a Section 163 order	District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate, or specially empowered Executive Magistrate
Maximum duration of a Section 163 order	Two months; extendable by the State Government by up to six months more
Penalty for disobedience	Section 223, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (successor to IPC Section 188)
Licensing of processions	Section 30, Police Act, 1861; no fee may be charged
Dispersal by civil force	Section 148, BNSS — officer not below the rank of sub-inspector
Protection for good-faith action	Section 151, BNSS — prior government sanction needed to prosecute
Subject allocation	Public order (Entry 1) and Police (Entry 2), State List
Supreme Court oral observations	27 July 2026; CJI Surya Kant, Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana

Detailed explainer: the three legal layers

Three distinct bodies of law are engaged, and confusing them is the commonest error in answer scripts.

Layer one: regulation under the Police Act, 1861

Section 30 empowers the District Superintendent to "direct the conduct of all assemblies and processions on the public roads" and prescribe routes and timings. Where an uncontrolled procession is judged "likely to cause a breach of the peace", organisers may be required to apply for a licence naming the licensees and setting conditions; a proviso bars any fee. Section 30A lets a Magistrate or senior officer stop a procession that breaches those conditions, and sub-section (2) is the sting: a procession refusing to obey "shall be deemed to be an unlawful assembly". A licensing breach converts a lawful gathering into an unlawful one by operation of law. Several states have parallel statutes; it was rules under the Bombay Police Act, 1951 that the Court examined in Himat Lal.

Layer two: prohibition under Section 163 of the BNSS, 2023

Section 163 tracks the Section 144 CrPC language it replaced. A District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or specially empowered Executive Magistrate may, "by a written order stating the material facts of the case", direct a person to abstain from an act, where this is likely to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury, danger to life or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquillity. Four features are examinable:

1. It applies only where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. An emergency power, not a standing regulation.
2. An order may be passed ex parte where circumstances do not permit timely notice.
3. It must state the material facts. A pro-forma order reciting statutory language without particulars is vulnerable.
4. It lapses in two months, extendable by the State Government by up to six further months, and only against danger to life, health or safety or to prevent a riot or affray.

Disobedience is punishable under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, successor to IPC Section 188. A counter-intuitive point flagged by The Indian Express: protest-related orders are a small share of actual Section 163 deployment in Delhi, most of which covers examinations, festivals and drone restrictions.

Layer three: dispersal and force under Chapter XI of the BNSS

Section 148 permits an Executive Magistrate, a station house officer, or in his absence any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector, to command an unlawful assembly — or any assembly of five or more likely to disturb the public peace — to disperse, and to use force if it does not. Section 149 allows the District Magistrate or an authorised Executive Magistrate present at the scene to requisition the armed forces, subject to an explicit proportionality rule: use "as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly". Section 151 shields good-faith action under Sections 148 to 150 from prosecution without prior government sanction, which is what makes independent accountability difficult in practice and why the July 2026 petitioners asked for a judicial commission.

Multi-dimensional analysis

The regulation-versus-prohibition dimension

Indian law has never treated protest as unregulated. From Himat Lal onward the courts have accepted that a state may require prior permission, prescribe routes and confine large gatherings to designated grounds. The constitutional line lies at the point where regulation becomes prohibition, or discretion becomes unguided — and that line is easy to cross without appearing to. A permission nominally available but refused without reasons, or granted too late to be useful, achieves prohibition by administrative means. Hence the July 2026 petitions target not the existence of Section 163 but its repetition: successive orders that, stacked end to end, produce what one petition calls "rolling prohibitory orders".

The proportionality dimension

Section 149 BNSS already carries a minimum-force rule and Anita Thakur supplies the constitutional standard. What is missing is not doctrine but operational specification: when may a lathi charge begin, who authorises it, what warnings must precede it, what record must be kept. The Court's 27 July 2026 remark about "uniformity in protocol" is aimed at that gap. The pellet-gun allegations, directed at the Rapid Action Force and denied by Delhi Police, sit in the same hole: India has no consolidated framework governing which "non-lethal" weapons may be used for crowd control, in what sequence, and with what medical protocol.

The accountability dimension

Three features work against post-hoc accountability. Section 151 BNSS requires sanction to prosecute good-faith action. The state investigating excesses by its own police is the conflict of interest Prakash Singh sought to cure through independent Police Complaints Authorities. And where personnel operate in plain clothes, attribution becomes impossible, which is why petitioners invoked D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal. Justice Bagchi added a symmetry worth carrying into an answer script: policemen were also injured on 20 July, and his question about missing helmets reframes the issue as one of institutional capacity.

The digital and federal dimensions

Metro closures and reported loss of mobile connectivity raise a separate question. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) held that indefinite internet suspension is impermissible, that such orders must satisfy proportionality, and that they must be published and periodically reviewed. Shutting down communications around a protest must independently justify itself. Federalism complicates the remedy: public order and police are State subjects, so a pan-India protocol framed by the Supreme Court would bind state forces on a matter allocated to states. Prakash Singh is both precedent and warning, since compliance with its seven directives remains partial two decades on.

Comparative and global perspective

Jurisdiction	Approach to prior authorisation for assembly
India	Constitutional right under Article 19(1)(b); in practice, permission or licence commonly required under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 or state police laws; prohibition available under Section 163 BNSS
United States	First Amendment protects assembly; content-neutral "time, place and manner" restrictions and permit requirements for large public gatherings are constitutional, but prior restraint on content is not
United Kingdom	Public Order Act, 1986 requires advance notification for most processions rather than permission; police may impose conditions and, in narrow circumstances, seek a prohibition
Germany	Article 8 of the Basic Law guarantees assembly without prior permission for peaceful, unarmed gatherings; open-air assemblies may be regulated by statute

Mature democracies have largely converged on a notification model rather than a permission model, and the difference is not semantic. Under notification the assembly proceeds unless the state establishes a reason to restrict it; under permission the default is silence until the state grants leave. India's constitutional text is closer to the first, its administrative practice, built on an 1861 statute, closer to the second. That mismatch is the heart of the debate. Article 21 of the ICCPR, ratified by India in 1979, points the same way.

Committee, court and expert views

The judicial line, in sequence

Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad — decided 15 September 1972, reported at (1973) 1 SCC 227, which is why you will see both years cited. A five-judge Constitution Bench examined rules under the Bombay Police Act, 1951 requiring written permission for street meetings. The majority held the state may regulate public streets in the interest of all, so a permission requirement is not per se unconstitutional; but Rule 7, allowing refusal without stated criteria, was void as infringing Article 19(1)(b). The principle: regulation yes, arbitrary discretion no.

In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, (2012) 5 SCC 1 — suo motu proceedings after the police action on the night of 4-5 June 2011 against sleeping supporters of Baba Ramdev, decided 23 February 2012. Section 144 can be invoked only where danger is imminent, not merely foreseeable, and the order must state material facts.

Anita Thakur v. Government of Jammu and Kashmir (12 August 2016). Peaceful demonstration is a fundamental right, the response must be proportionate, and disproportionate force attracts compensation.

Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (23 July 2018, Justices A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan). The challenge was to a fresh Section 144 order issued every sixty days over Central Delhi, alongside an NGT order of October 2017 banning protests at Jantar Mantar on noise grounds. The Court held there cannot be a complete ban at Jantar Mantar and the Boat Club, and directed the Commissioner of Police to frame guidelines permitting regulated protest in part of the area. It also accepted that residents had genuine grievances, so read it as a balancing exercise.

Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (7 October 2020), from the Shaheen Bagh sit-in: public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely and demonstrations must be held in designated areas. This is the outer limit of the right and the likeliest Prelims distractor against Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan. The two do not conflict — one says the state cannot ban protest everywhere, the other says protesters cannot occupy any place forever.

Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) is not a protest case but underpins every accountability argument. Its seven directives include a State Security Commission, minimum two-year tenures, separation of investigation from law and order, and Police Complaints Authorities. Implementation remains uneven, which is why the July 2026 petitions sought enforcement of an old judgment rather than new law.

What the Court said in July 2026

"Right to peaceful protest is absolutely guaranteed. That cannot be denied. Merely because there is agitation cannot justify police excess … Just because there is an agitation does not mean there should be lathi charge. Self-evolved discipline is needed which is essential to democratic process." — CJI Surya Kant, oral observations, 27 July 2026

Two cautions. These are oral observations in legal reporting, not a judgment, so they carry persuasive weight but no ratio. And the case is live: as of 27 July 2026 the batch, led by Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India (Diary No. 44078/2026), stood listed for 28 July 2026. Write about the direction of travel, not an outcome. The reliefs sought make good Mains material: guidelines barring crowd-control duty or arrests in plain clothes; an SOP for Section 163 BNSS prohibiting blanket or repetitive orders without a recorded, proximate threat; a judicial commission or SIT headed by a retired Supreme Court judge; implementation of the Prakash Singh reforms; and guidelines confining Section 152 of the BNS, 2023 so that it cannot reach peaceful protest absent direct and imminent incitement.

Way forward

1. Move from permission to notification for assemblies below a defined threshold. Amend state police rules so gatherings under a stated size at designated sites need only advance intimation, with the burden on police to record reasons for any condition imposed. Section 163 stays available for genuine emergencies.
2. Cap consecutive Section 163 orders over the same area. A two-month limit means nothing if a fresh order issues on day sixty-one. Require every renewal to rest on a recorded, area-specific threat assessment published within twenty-four hours, so it can be challenged before it lapses.
3. Issue a national crowd-control weapons protocol. Specify the escalation ladder from verbal warning to water cannon, tear gas and baton, the authorising rank at each step, mandatory videography, and an express bar on pellet-firing shotguns against non-violent crowds.
4. Give Police Complaints Authorities their own investigators. Most states created these bodies after Prakash Singh but staffed them with seconded police officers. Without independent capacity, the Section 151 sanction requirement becomes an absolute bar rather than a filter. Pair this with protective equipment and de-escalation training for personnel: Justice Bagchi's question about helmets is the operational half of the rights argument, because officers who feel exposed escalate faster.
5. Codify a protest-communications rule and expand designated sites. Following Anuradha Bhasin, require any suspension of telecom services or closure of transport nodes during a demonstration to be by written, published, time-limited order with reasons. And equip the designated grounds themselves: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan turned partly on Jantar Mantar having become unmanageable, and sanitation, sound limits and medical posts reduce the friction that produces confrontation.

Static and current linkage

• Laxmikanth, Indian Polity: Fundamental Rights — Article 19, the six freedoms, reasonable restrictions, proportionality; and writ jurisdiction under Article 32.
• D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India: Article 19(2) versus Article 19(3) grounds.
• NCERT Class 11, Indian Constitution at Work: chapter on Fundamental Rights.
• Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 5th Report ("Public Order"): crowd management, police accountability and misuse of preventive provisions.
• Current linkage: the shift from CrPC, IPC and Evidence Act to BNSS, BNS and BSA on 1 July 2024 — Section 144 CrPC to Section 163 BNSS, IPC 188 to BNS 223, and the new Section 152 BNS.

Prelims pointers

• The right to protest derives from Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b); there is no separately worded Article. Article 19(1)(b) covers assembly peaceably and without arms.
• Article 19(3) permits restrictions on assembly on only two grounds: sovereignty and integrity of India, and public order.
• Article 19(2) lists eight grounds for restricting speech.
• "Sovereignty and integrity of India" was added to Articles 19(2), 19(3) and 19(4) by the Sixteenth Amendment Act, 1963.
• Article 19 rights are available to citizens only.
• Public order is Entry 1 and Police is Entry 2 of the State List.
• Section 163 BNSS, 2023 replaced Section 144 CrPC, 1973; an order may be passed ex parte and must state the material facts.
• A Section 163 order lapses in two months, extendable by the State Government by six months; disobedience attracts Section 223 BNS, 2023.
• Section 148 BNSS: dispersal by civil force; minimum police rank sub-inspector. Section 149: armed forces requisitioned by the District Magistrate. Section 151: no prosecution of good-faith action without government sanction.
• Section 30, Police Act, 1861: licensing of processions; no fee may be charged. Section 30A deems a disobedient procession an unlawful assembly.
• Unlawful assembly is defined in Section 189 BNS, 2023; rioting in Section 191 BNS, 2023.
• Himat Lal K. Shah (1972-73): five-judge Constitution Bench; Rule 7 under the Bombay Police Act struck down for unguided discretion.
• Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012): suo motu writ; Section 144 requires imminent danger.
• Anita Thakur (2016): disproportionate police force attracts compensation.
• Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018): no complete ban on protest at Jantar Mantar and the Boat Club.
• Amit Sahni (2020, Shaheen Bagh): public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely.
• Prakash Singh (2006): seven directives on police reform, including Police Complaints Authorities.
• Anuradha Bhasin (2020): indefinite internet suspension is impermissible; orders must be published and reviewed.
• India ratified the ICCPR in 1979; its Article 21 recognises peaceful assembly.

Mains linkage

Probable question 1 (GS-2, 15 marks): "A right that requires permission is a privilege. Critically examine the requirement of prior police permission for public assemblies in India."

Skeleton: Begin with Article 19(1)(b) and the narrow Article 19(3) grounds, then set against them Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 and Section 163 BNSS. Himat Lal supplies the test: permission per se is constitutional, unguided refusal is not. Identify the failure mode — unreasoned refusal and rolling Section 163 orders. Compare the UK and German notification model, and close with Amit Sahni as counterweight. Keywords: reasonable restriction, unguided discretion, prior restraint, notification versus permission, proportionality.

Probable question 2 (GS-2, 15 marks): "Police accountability for the use of force during public demonstrations remains structurally weak in India. Discuss and suggest reforms."

Skeleton: Three structural barriers — the Section 151 sanction requirement, the absence of independent investigative capacity in Police Complaints Authorities, and non-identification of personnel contrary to D.K. Basu — plus the missing crowd-control weapons protocol. Use the July 2026 petitions as illustration and the Second ARC's Public Order report as anchor. Keywords: Prakash Singh directives, Police Complaints Authority, proportionality, sanction to prosecute.

Probable question 3 (GS-2, 10 marks): "Distinguish between the grounds for restricting freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Why does the distinction matter?"

Skeleton: Eight grounds in Article 19(2) against two in Article 19(3), with "sovereignty and integrity of India" entering both via the Sixteenth Amendment, 1963. Consequence: prohibitory orders almost always rest on public order, a threshold higher than inconvenience. Keywords: Article 19(3), public order, Sixteenth Amendment, over-breadth.

Mains practice question with model answer structure

Q. "The Indian state does not deny the right to protest; it manages it into irrelevance." Critically examine in the light of recent developments. (250 words, 15 marks)

Introduction (about 30 words): State the doctrinal position — Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), restricted only on the two Article 19(3) grounds — and flag the gap between that text and practice built on an 1861 statute.

Body — the case for (about 80 words): Permission under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 turning a right into an application; rolling Section 163 orders of the kind challenged in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan; confinement to designated sites out of political sightlines; communication disruption and transport closures; the Section 151 sanction bar; and the 20 July 2026 march, where prohibitory orders preceded the event.

Body — the case against (about 70 words): Courts have policed the outer limits — Himat Lal on unguided discretion, Ramlila Maidan on imminence, Anita Thakur on proportionality. Regulation is also necessary: Amit Sahni confirms indefinite occupation is unprotected, and residents' rights and police safety are competing interests.

Body — judgement (about 40 words): The problem is not restriction but its architecture: emergency powers used routinely, discretion without recorded reasons, accountability that exists on paper.

Conclusion (about 30 words): Shifting the default to notification, capping consecutive prohibitory orders and giving Police Complaints Authorities real investigative capacity would close the gap between constitutional promise and street.

Key terms glossary

• Reasonable restriction: a limitation authorised by the relevant clause of Article 19, imposed by law, satisfying proportionality and non-arbitrariness.
• Public order: tranquillity prevailing in a political society; a graver disturbance than mere inconvenience.
• Prohibitory order: a written direction under Section 163 BNSS requiring abstention from specified acts in a defined area.
• Unlawful assembly: an assembly of five or more persons with a common object specified in Section 189 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
• Ex parte order: an order passed without hearing the person affected, permitted under Section 163(2) BNSS in an emergency.
• Proportionality: a measure must pursue a legitimate aim, be rationally connected to it, be the least restrictive means, and strike a fair balance with the right infringed.
• Police Complaints Authority: an independent body mandated by Prakash Singh (2006) to inquire into serious police misconduct.

Quick revision summary

• Right to protest is not a separate Article; it is read out of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b).
• Article 19(1)(b): right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
• Article 19(3) permits restrictions on assembly only on two grounds: sovereignty and integrity of India, and public order.
• Article 19(2), which governs speech, has eight grounds — a wider list than Article 19(3).
• Section 163 of the BNSS, 2023 replaced Section 144 of the CrPC, 1973.
• A Section 163 order lasts a maximum of two months; the State Government may extend it up to six months more.
• Disobedience of a Section 163 order is punishable under Section 223 of the BNS, 2023 (successor to IPC Section 188).
• Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 allows the police to license and route processions; no fee may be charged.
• Sections 148 to 151 of the BNSS govern dispersal of assemblies, including by armed forces, with a minimum-force rule.
• Himat Lal K. Shah (1972-73): prior permission is permissible, but unguided discretion to refuse is unconstitutional.
• Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012): Section 144 requires imminent danger, not foreseeable risk.
• Anita Thakur v. State of J&K (2016): peaceful protest is a fundamental right; disproportionate force attracts compensation.
• Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018): repeated prohibitory orders creating a blanket ban on Central Delhi are impermissible.
• Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020, Shaheen Bagh): public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely.
• On 27 July 2026, a bench led by CJI Surya Kant said 'merely because there is agitation cannot justify police excess' and listed the matter for 28 July.

Frequently asked questions

Is the right to protest a fundamental right in India?

Yes, though not as a separately worded Article. It is derived from Article 19(1)(a), freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. The Supreme Court has affirmed this repeatedly, most recently in oral observations on 27 July 2026 that the right to peaceful protest is 'absolutely guaranteed under the Constitution'.

Do you need police permission to hold a protest in India?

In most states, yes, for public meetings, processions, rallies and the use of loudspeakers. The statutory hook is Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 and equivalent state police legislation. In Himat Lal K. Shah, a Constitution Bench held that requiring prior permission is not by itself unconstitutional. What is unconstitutional is a rule that gives the authority unguided discretion to refuse.

What is Section 163 of the BNSS and how is it different from Section 144 CrPC?

Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is the direct successor to Section 144 of the CrPC, 1973 and is worded almost identically. It lets a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or specially empowered Executive Magistrate issue a written order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. Orders can be passed ex parte in an emergency, last a maximum of two months, and may be extended by the State Government by up to six months more.

What did the Supreme Court say about police action on protesters in July 2026?

On 27 July 2026, a bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana observed orally that the right to peaceful protest is constitutionally guaranteed and that 'merely because there is agitation cannot justify police excess'. The bench said uniformity of protocol was needed across states and directed that all connected petitions be heard together on 28 July 2026. These were oral observations, not a binding judgment.

Can the police impose prohibitory orders repeatedly over the same area?

Not as a routine practice. In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court dealt with successive 60-day Section 144 orders that effectively made Central Delhi a permanent prohibited zone, and held that a complete ban on protest at Jantar Mantar and the Boat Club was unacceptable. It directed the Commissioner of Police to frame proper guidelines for regulated protest at those sites.

Does the right to protest include the right to block a road indefinitely?

No. In Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020), arising from the Shaheen Bagh sit-in, the Supreme Court held that while dissent and democracy go hand in hand, demonstrations must take place in designated areas and public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely. Occupation of a public thoroughfare is not protected by Article 19(1)(b).

What are the legal limits on the use of force by police against protesters?

Sections 148 to 151 of the BNSS, 2023 govern dispersal. Section 148 permits an Executive Magistrate, an officer in charge of a police station, or a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to command an unlawful assembly to disperse and to use force if it does not. Section 149 allows armed forces to be requisitioned, with the explicit direction that the officer 'shall use as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly'. Section 151 protects good-faith action from prosecution without government sanction.

How do the restriction grounds under Article 19(2) and Article 19(3) differ?

This distinction is frequently tested. Article 19(2), which restricts free speech, lists eight grounds: sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence. Article 19(3), which restricts assembly, lists only two: sovereignty and integrity of India, and public order. The narrower list means a restriction on assembly cannot be justified on, say, decency or defamation grounds.

What triggered the July 2026 protests in Delhi?

Allegations of a paper leak in the NEET-UG examination held on 3 May 2026, taken by roughly 22.79 lakh candidates. The National Testing Agency cancelled the examination on 12 May 2026 and the case was referred to the CBI. Protests led by the Cockroach Janta Party, founded by Abhijeet Dipke on 16 May 2026, culminated in the 'Chalo Sansad' march of 20 July 2026. Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan resigned on 25 July 2026.

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Sources

• The Indian Express, “CJP march to Parliament: What is the law invoked to impose curfew across New Delhi, how it is used”, 21 July 2026. Link
• The Hindu, “Delhi protest crackdown: SC says right to peaceful protest constitutionally protected, mulls framing guidelines”, 27 July 2026. Link
• LiveLaw, “'Peaceful Protests Constitutionally Protected, Mere Agitation Can't Justify Lathi-Charge': CJI Surya Kant In Pleas Over Jantar Mantar Police Action”, 27 July 2026. Link
• [Primary] Supreme Court of India (Digital Supreme Court Reports), “Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India — judgment on prohibitory orders and protest at Jantar Mantar”, 23 July 2018. Link
• [Primary] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, “The Police Act, 1861 (full text, including Sections 30 and 30A on regulation and licensing of assemblies and processions)”, 1861. Link